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Abstract. We consider protocols in which a signature authority issues RSA-signatures to an 
individual. These signatures are in general products of rational powers of residue classes modulo 
the composite number of the underlying RSA-system. These residue classes are chosen at random 
by the signature authority. Assuming that it is infeasible for the individual to compute RSA-
roots on randomly chosen residue classes by himself, we give, as a consequence of our main 
theorem, necessary and sufficient conditions describing whether it is feasible for the individual to 
compute RSA-signatures of a prescribed type from signatures of other types that he received 
before from the authority. 
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1. Introduction 
A cryptographic protocol can be taken to be a set of rules according to which messages 
are transmitted between parties. Generally the parties apply cryptographic operations 
(such as computation of digital signatures and encryption) to the messages sent and 
received, in order to protect their interests. 
In this paper we consider signature protocols in which only one party, called the 
signature authority, can create signatures. The signature authority issues these 
signatures to an other party, called the individual. Such protocols are used, for instance, 
in credential systems (e.g. [CE86]) and payment systems (e.g. [CBHMS89]), in which a 
signature represents a credential or money. 
:j: This research has been made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and 
Sciences (KN.A.W.) 
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Figure 1 shows a simple version based on the RSA-system with modulus N. Let 
e1,e2 be public exponents, known to both the signature authority Zand the individual A, 
and l/e2 the secret exponent, known only to Z. Here 1/e2 is some integer such that 
l / e 6 2 • ( x 2) = x(mod N), for all x copnme to N. (Note that this implies that only Z 
knows the factorization of the RSA modulus). 
Individual A 
chooses x (mod N) randomly, 
computes S = xe11' 2 (mod N) 
Signature authority Z 
verifies if 
x,S 
S'2 = x'1 (mod N) 
Fig. 1. A signature issuing protocol in which the 
individual has no influence on the choice of the integer. 
The protocols we shall consider, are variations on or generalizations of the scheme in 
Figure 1. It will appear to be useful to consider variations in which Z does not send x to 
A, but only the signature (so then A can not verify the signature). In our most general 
protocols, the RSA-signatures are products of rational powers of residue classes modulo 
N, for instance ii / 5 • 41 7 (mod N). It is reasonable to assume that an individual, not 
knowing the factorization of N, can not compute RSA-roots x 11d (mod N) on a 
randomly chosen x for d>l by himself. Yet it is possible that the individual learns some 
RSA-signatures computed by Z (e.g. by participating in some protocol or by 
eavesdropping) and can use these to compute some new signatures of a type not issued 
by Z. The purpose of this paper is to investigate which new types of RSA-signatures an 
individual can compute from the ones obtained from Z. 
We give an example of the kind of problems we shall consider. Suppose A has 
received, by participating in some protocol (or by eavesdropping) two random integers 
x 1,x2 and a signature S = ii / 5 · ~ / 7 (mod N) . Then A can compute .xi / 5 , using that 
.xi / 5 = xi · 4 I S (mod N). On the other hand we shall prove that for all positive 
integers d different from 1 and 5 (and relatively prime to <p(N)), it is infeasible for A to 
compute .xi / d from ( x1, x2, S). Another consequence of our results is a result of Shamir 
[Sh83] which states that it is feasible for A to compute x11 m from ( .x; ] / a1, .. ., } / a') 
if and only if m divides the least common multiple of (a 1,. .. ,as). In section 3 we give 
more detailed examples related to coin systems. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the notation used in this paper is 
introduced. Section 3 contains descriptions of the RSA scheme and the four protocols that 
we want to investigate. We shall state four propositions related to the respective 
protocols and give some examples and applications to illustrate these propositions. With 
the lemmas of section 4, the four propositions will be proven in section 5. 
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The propositions of section 3 can not be considered as mathematical statements since 
they involve an intuitive notion of computational feasibility which we shall not formalize. 
Therefore in our main theorem in section 6, we will not use any assumption on the 
computational feasibility of RSA-roots by individuals. In this extended abstract we shall 
only state this theorem in words without using the formalism of Probabilistic Turing 
Machines, and we shall not prove this theorem here. 
2. Notation 
The following notation is used throughout this paper: 
IN,Z,IQ 
alb 
a=b (modm) 
a 
<a,b> 
[a1 .•• a1] 
[Ca] 
def(a1, ••. ,a,;b) 
N 
z* N 
<p(N) 
'QN 
the sets of positive integers, all integers and rational numbers 
respectively. 
the greatest common divisor of a 1, •.• ,a1; also defined for rational 
(a 1 d ..... a,d) 
numbers by (a 1, ... ,a 1): = d , where de IN such that 
a1 d, ... ,a1de Z; this definition is independent of the choice of d. 
the least common multiple of a 1, .•. ,a1e IQ (this is defined for rational 
numbers analogously to the gcd). 
there is an integer c such that ac=b; also defined for a,be IQ. 
it holds that ml(a-b), for a,be IQ, me IN; we shall omit the suffix 
(mod m), if no confusion is likely to arise. 
the set of k-dimensional column vectors with entries from the set S. 
column vector (a1, ... ,aiJT; if aeSk, then a 1, ... ,akeS. 
the ith unit vector (0, ... ,0,l,O, ... ,O)T which has a 1 on the ith place and 
zeros elsewhere (the dimension of these vectors will follow from the 
context). 
T the scalar product of two column vectors a=(a 1, ... ,ak) and 
b=(b1, ... ,bk)T, which is defined by <a,b>=a1b1+ ... +akbk. 
the matrix with columns a1, ... ,a1• 
the matrix with column vector a concatenated at the right to matrix C. 
the defect of a 1, ... ,a1;be IQ k; this is the smallest positive integer d 
such that [a 1 ... a 1]y=db has a solution ye Z 1 (well defined if 
[a 1 ••• a 1]x=b has a solution xe IQ 1). Examples: def(3;1)=3, 
def(5;1)=5, def(3,5;1)=1. 
the RSA modulus used in all the protocols; N is a composite, odd 
number. 
the set {al ae IN, 1 :s; a:s; N, (a, N)= 1}. 
Euler's Totient function; <p(N)=I z"N I. 
the set <1-la, be Z, b>O, (b, <p(N))= l}. 
alb 
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x~ 1 x; 2 ••• x: 1(mod N), for x=(xl> ... ,xkl e ( z*N )k and 
a=(a1, .•• ,ak)T e ( «:) )k. Examples: xe i = x., and if N I 
b b 
x= (x 1, ... , x 1), then x4= x<a, b>. 
al 0 t T . . <T····· z;-) , 1f b~O for i=l, ... ,k. 
I t 
3. Protocols 
In this paper we will consider 4 protocols, and each but the first is a generalization of the 
previous one. In each protocol, a signature authority Z issues one or more RSA-
signatures of certain types to the individual A, who has no influence on the integers used. 
We deal with the problem to determine for which other types of RSA-signatures it is 
feasible for A to compute them from the types of signatures that he obtaine~ from Z. 
In order to avoid technical complications ,we shall not give a mathematically precise 
definition of the notion "computational feasibility", but only the following intuitive 
definition. If a1, ••• ,a1 are binary strings chosen according to some prescribed probability 
distribution and b is a binary string with b=f(a 1, ••. ,a1) for some function f, then we 
say that it is feasible to compute b from a1, ••• ,a1 if there is an efficient probabilistic 
algorithm that outputs b with non-negligible probability, when it is given a 1, • .• ,a1 as 
input. In this section we shall freely use the notion of computational feasibility in 
statements of propositions, corollaries etc. We shall state four propositions, each related 
to a protocol. 
First we briefly sketch the RSA scheme [RSA78]. The signature authority Z chooses 
two large "random" primes, each of 100 decimal digits say, and computes their product 
N, which will be used as RSA modulus. 
Let de z• . The equation dd = 1 (mod <p( N)) t has a unique solution 
<p(N) 
de Z~(N) which can be computed by Z, because Z knows the factorization of N (and 
thus <p(N)). We define xaf d (mod N) to be the unique solution y E z*N to 
yd= x° (mod N), for xe Z~ and ~e «:) N. This solution y can be computed by 
y = ruf (mod N). We call x11d (mod N) the dth RSA-root of xe z*N' 
Z makes N and d public, and keeps d and the factorization of N secret. The RSA-
signatures issued by Z in the protocols are products of rational powers of residue classes. 
For all the signatures in this paper the same modulus is used. The case that an individual 
receives signatures with different moduli is partially solved in [Has85]. 
t The RSA-scheme can be made slightly more efficient by solving ([ from dd = 1 (mod A.( N)), where 
A.(N) is Carmichael's function. For instance, if N=PQ for primes P ,Q, then tp(N)=(P-l)(Q-1) and 
Af,N)=rp{N)/(P-l,Q-1). 
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We assume that it is computationally infeasible for an individual A to compute RSA-
roots by himself: the only positive integer d with (d,<p(N))==l for which A can feasibly 
compute x 11d (mod N) for uniformly chosen x from Z *N, is d== l. In other words: 
Assumption. Let N be the used RSA-modulus. Then for every integer d> 1 with 
(d,<p(N))=l it is computational infeasible for A to compute x11d (mod N) when 
given only N,d;x as input, where x is chosen uniformly from z*N 
We now describe the four protocols, the propositions and some examples (related to 
coin systems) to illustrate the propositions. 
3.1. Protocol 1 
Protocol 1. z makes public integers a,n with alnE m . 
N 
( 1) Z chooses x uniformly from z*N and computes the RSA-signature 
S= :x!1 1 n(mod N). 
(2) Z sends the pair (x,S) to A. 
(3) A verifies the RSA-signature on x by checking if 1 = xa(mod N) . 
We consider the problem for which integers m>O with (m,<p(N))==l, A is able to 
compute x 11 m (mod N) from the pair (x,S) that he received from Z. Necessary and 
sufficient conditions are given in the next proposition. 
Proposition 1. Fix integers a,n,m with n,m>O and (n,<p(N))==(m,<p(N))== (a,n)==l. 
Then the following three statements are equivalent: 
(i) It is feasible for A to compute xll m from (x, xaf n ), if Z chooses x uniformly 
from z.*N. 
(ii) There are integers v,w such that llm=v.aln + w. 
(iii) min. 
Proposition 1 can be applied to coin systems, such as in Figure 2. Here f is a fixed, 
public, "pseudo-random" function. In a coin system, different exponents s are used, each 
representing another coin value. Suppose that the exponents s==3,5,7,9 (assumed to be 
coprime with <p(N)) are used, and that they correspond to the coin values 8,4,2,1 
respectively. Now any user A can gain 7 money units simply by withdrawing a coin of 
. . f C f )1 I 9 . ..3 f( \l / 3 h" h . . value 1, which 1s o the form = (y , and computing C..: = y 1 , w ic is a coin 
of value 8. One can prevent users from gaining money by replacing s==9 for instance by 
. . 1/11 1/7 1/5 
s=ll. Assume that A withdraws the corns f( y) , f( y) and f( y) of value 
1,2 and 4 respectively. Then A can compute f(y) 11<5 · 7 · ll) by 
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f(y)l/(5· 1. 11) = (/(y)1' 5) 3 (/(y)1f7)1 3 (f(y) 1111r 21 But by propos1tton 1, A cannot 
compute f( yf 1 3 from f (y) 11<5 · 7 · 11 ) • So A cannot gain a money unit. 
Withdrawal of a coin Spending of a coin 
User Bank User Shop 
y: random 
f(y) y,f(y)l/s 
Fig. 2. A simple coin system 
3.2. Protocol 2 
In Protocol 2, Z issues to A one RSA-signature that is a product of powers of RSA-
roots on integers (chosen by Z). Proposition 2 describes which new RSA-signatures are 
feasibly computable from the received ones. 
Protocol 2. Z makes public vectors a ,n e Z k such that a In e (a'.) N) k. Let 
n*:::::lcm(n1, .. . ,n,). 
(1) Z chooses X uniformly from (Z*N)k, and computes the signature 
S = x° I n (mod N). 
(2) Z sends (x, S) to A. 
(3) A verifies the signature on x by checking whether 
,.11' = a1n •I n1 • • a 1 n' I n k( od N) 
.) - x1 ... xk m . 
Proposition 2. Fix vectors a,n,b,m E Z k with (ai,ni)=(bi,mi)=(ni,<p(N))= 
(mi,<p(N))=l for i:::::l, .. . ,k. Then the following three statements are equivalent: 
(i) It is feasible for A to compute xbl m from ( x, x" 1 n), if Z chooses x uniformly 
* k from (Z N) . 
(ii) There are VE z and a vector WE zk such that blm=v(aln)+w. 
(iii) milni for i=l, ... ,k and 
aibjn/m j = ajbin/mi mod (ni>n) for lS.ijS.k. 
10 3i- I 
To illustrate this proposition, we consider the product TI x. 1 17 . We are interested in 
i= 1 I 
the question whether it is feasible for an individual to change the order of the terms in the 
product, i.e. is it feasible for an individual to find a non-identical permutation r such that 
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10 3i- l 10 3T(i)- l 
IT x. 111 = IT xi 111 ? Using the next corollary (which can be derived from 
i=l I i=l 
Proposition 2) we can prove that this is not feasible. So to each position in this product 
(i.e. to each exponent) we can assign a different coin value. This result is used in the 
offline check system of [CBHMS89]. 
Corollary 1. Let p and q be different primes such that (p,<p(N))=(q,<p(N))=l and 
let k,m be integers. Define the integral vectors a=(qm, .. .,qm+k-I)T and n=(p, ... ,p/. 
The following statements are equivalent if x is chosen randomly from (Z*N)k. 
(i) There is a non-identical permutation 't" of (0, ... ,k-1), such that it is feasible for A 
to compute x1'1n from (x,ri1n) where b=(qm+T(O),. .. ,qm+T(k-l))T. 
i (ii) There is an io with l::;;io$;k such that q 0 = 1 (mod p). 
3.3. Protocol 3 
We now consider a general protocol, in which Z issues to A several signatures at 
once, together with the chosen vector x. Notice that sending x is exactly the same as 
( e1 ek) ii'> k sending x ,. . ., x , where e1,. .. ,ek are the unit vectors of (u.i N) . 
Protocol 3. Z makes public vectors a1 •... ,a8e (~ N/. 
* k a (1) Z chooses x uniformly from (Z N) , and computes Si= x '(mod N) for 
i=l, ... ,s. 
(2) Z sends (x, S11 •.• ,S8 ) to A. 
(3) A verifies that 1. = xd01(mod N) fori=l, ... ,s, where dis a positive integer such 
' 
that da1,. .. ,dase zk. 
We want to know for which vectors be (a'.) N)k, it is feasible for A to compute 
x"(mod N) from ( x, x0 1, ... , x0 '). 
Proposition 3. Fix vectors a1,. • .,a8 ,be (~ Nl. Then the following four statements are 
equivalent: 
(i) It is feasible for A to compute xb from ( x, x01, • •• , x0 '), if Z chooses x uniformly 
* k from (Z N) . 
(ii) There are V1,-·.,VsE z and a vector WE zk such that b=v1a1 + ... +vs0s+W. 
(iii) def(a 1, .. .,a8 ,e1,. .• ,ek;b)=l. 
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(iv) Let A. 1, ... ,A.m be all the subdeterminants of [a 1 ... asl of order between 1 and 
min(k,s), and A.m+i•··.,An be all the subdeterminants of [a 1 ••. as b] of order 
between 1 and min(k,s+ 1), containing at least one entry from b. Then 
(1,A.1, ... ,A.m)=(l,A.1, ... ,An) (i.e. (1,A.1, ... ,Am) IA.i,for i=m+l, .. .,n). 
To illustrate how this proposition can be used, we consider the off-line coin system of 
[0089]. In this system the bank uses a signature scheme which we do not specify here. 
The user makes RSA-signatures using his own modulus N whose factorization he keeps 
secret; so here the user plays the role of a signature authority. Let L be a fixed integer, 
and define I= (account number user)L mod N. In Figure 3 the basic idea of the 
withdrawal (in which the user is able to blind and the bank to sign messages, cf. [0089]) 
and spending protocol of a coin is given. Each shop sends the numbers it received to the 
bank and the bank verifies that these numbers have not been used before. Since the 
system is off-line, usually each shop first collects the numbers from several payments 
before sending them to the bank. 
User 
X: random 
Withdrawal of a coin 
Bank 
blindcd(N,/ ,X) 
sign(blindcd(N,l ,X)) 
User 
Spending of a coin 
N,l,X, sign(N,/,X) 
E: random, (£,L)=l 
c .. (X- !E)1IL modN 
Fig. 3. The (simplified) off-line coin system of [0089] 
Shop 
From Proposition 3 it follows that it is not feasible for the shop/bank to compute the 
"d . f h c· /1/ L d ) f , d c 1/ L El L . 1 entity o t e user i.e. mo N ram N,1,X,E an = X · I . But 1f the 
user spends the same coin at two shops, then the bank receives the integers 
( r )Ill N,/,X,sign(N,/,X), E 1 ,E 2 (coprime. with L), X·l, 1 modN and 
(X · IE2 ) IJL mod N . From Proposition 3 it follows that the bank can compute the users 
identity /I L mod N from this if and only if (£1-£2,L)=l. Hence the probability that a 
double spender is caught by the bank is approximately cp(L)IL. This probability is close 
to 1 if L is a large prime, and close to 0 if L is the product of small primes. Therefore it is 
not wise to let the user choose L himself (which was the original suggestion of [0089]), 
but to fix L as a large prime. 
Suppose we modify protocol 3 in such a way that an individual A receives s 
signatures on different vectors, so suppose A has received (x 1 , ... ,x 5 , 
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a a a k · 
S1 =x1 1 , ••• , S9 : xs') and wants to compute Ss+ 1 = xs~+;, where aie (QN) 'and 
* kl • 
xie (Z N) .(i=l, ... ,s+l). Define y to be the vector obtained by concatenating all the 
different entries of the vectors x1, ..• ,xs+l· We can write Si as / 1 , where the exponent 
on the "new" y/s (i.e. those Yj which were no entry of x;) is zero. Now Proposition 3 
can be used to determine for which as+l it is feasible for A to compute S s+l from 
(y,S1, ... ,Ss)· 
3.4. Protocol 4 
We now consider the most general protocol, in which Z issues to A several signatures 
at once, but without sending the used vector. 
Protocol 4. Z makes public vectors a1, ... ,ase (~ N)". 
"' k a (1) Z chooses x uniformly from (Z N) , and computes Si= x i(mod N) for 
i=l, ... ,s. 
(2) Z sends ( Sv .. . ,Ss) to A. 
If one does not accept this as a useful protocol (because A can in general not verify 
the signatures), then assume A has received ( x\ .. . , xa ') during eavesdropping. We 
want to know for which vectors be (~ N)", it is feasible for A to compute .i'(mod N) 
a a b from ( x 1, ••• , x ') , and prove that the only b 's for which x is computable from 
( x01 , ••• , x0 •), is the lattice generated by a1, ... ,as. 
Proposition 4. Fix vectors a 1,. .. ,as,be (~ N)", and assume that the equation 
[a 1 ... as]y=b is solvable in ye IQ 9 • Then the following four statements are 
equivalent: 
(i) It is feasible for A to compute x 11 from ( x\ ... , x0 '), if Z chooses x uniformly 
.. " from (Z N) • 
(ii) There are v1, ... ,vse Z such that b = v1a1 + ... + vsas· 
(iii) def(a 1, ... ,a9;b)=l. 
(iv) Let µ1' ... ,µm be the subdeterminants of [a1 ... as] of order k and µm+l'· .. ,µn be 
the subdeterminants of [a1 ••• a9 b] of order k, containing at least one entry from 
b. 
Then (l,µ1, .. . ,µm)=(I,µ 1, ••• ,µn) (i.e. (1,µ1, ... ,µm) Iµ;, for i=m+I, ... ,n). 
This proposition implies that only the exponents must be investigated, and that the 
only reasonable computations an individual can do, in order to create a new signature from 
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some received signatures, are the basic computations (add, subtract, multiply and divide). 
So applying the cosine or DES can not help an individual in creating more signatures. 
The previous propositions can be used to prove the following results. 
Corollary 2. Let a,a1 , ... ,as1b,d be positive integers coprime with <p(N), c be an 
integer, and x,y be chosen randomly from z*N. Then the following five results hold for A. 
(i) It is feasible to compute x 11 d from (x, xcl a) <=> di (a~ c) · 
1/ d 1/ a II b di a (ii) It is feasible to compute x from (x,y, x · Y ) <=> (a, b) · 
(1·1·1·) I · fi "bi l/ d fi ( 1 I a 1 l / a') di 1 ( ) t is easz e to compute x rom x, x , ... , x <=> cm a 1, ••• , as 
[Sh83]. 
1 / d 1 / a 1/ b (iv) It is feasible to compute (xy) from(x, y, x , y ) <=> di (a, b) . 
) fi bi di', (al a.-. (v It is easi e to compute x Jrom x , ... , x , <=> gcd(a1, .. . ,as) I d. 
4. Auxiliary results 
When we say that something is computable in polynomial time, we mean that it is 
computable by a polynomial time deterministic algorithm. 
Lemma 1. The following operations can be done in polynomial time: 
(1) computing gcd(a,b)from a and b, 
(2) computing the inverse of a (mod b)from a and b, if (a,b)=l, 
(3) computing ab (mod c)from a,b and c, if (a,c)=l, 
( 4) the Gaussian elimination method for a system of linear equations with rational 
coefficients, 
(5) determining the rank of a rational matrix, 
(6) determining the determinant of a given rational square matrix, 
(7) determining the inverse of a nonsingular rational square matrix, 
(8) testing rational vectors for linear independence, 
(9) computing the Hermite Normal Form of a matrix [KaBa79], 
(10) computing a unimodular matrix U, such that AU is the Hermite Normal Form of 
A, for a rational matrix A of full row rank, 
(11) deciding if a system of rational linear equations has an integral solution, and if 
so,finding one. 
References for the proofs can be found in Chapter 3 and 5 in [Schr86]. 
Lemma 2. ([Heg1858] page 111) 
Let A be a rational matrix of full row rank, with k rows, and let b be a rational column k-
vector. Then Ax=b has an integral solution x, if and only if the gcd of all 
subdeterminants of A of order k divides each sub determinant of [A b] of order k. 
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k Lemma 3. Let a 1, ... ,as,be (t) N) • A=[a 1 ... a 5 ] of full row rank, and let 
d=def(al' .. . ,as;b); hence 
Av=db (4.1) 
is solvable in ve zs. 
Further, let µ 1, ... ,µm be the subdeterminants of A of order k and µm+i•···•µn be the 
subdeterminants of [A b] of order k, containing at least one entry from b. 
Then: 
(i) d=..,-~-(µ_,_ •._ ... _µ_J~~~ (µ, ..... µ,.. µ ..... 1····· µ.). (4.2) 
(ii) There is a polynomial time deterministic algorithm that computes d and a solution 
of (4.1). 
(iii) There is a polynomial time deterministic algorithm that computes a ze IQ k such 
that 
(d,<z,db>)=l and ATZE zs. (4.3) 
Remark: Note that expression (4.2) does not yield a polynomial time algorithm to 
compute def(a1, ... ,a5;b), because m=(~). n- m=(k~ 1), and s;;:Jc. 
Proof. Matrix A has full row rank, so according to Lemmas 1.7 and 1.10, we can 
compute in polynomial time a matrix [DO] (in Hermite Normal Form in which D is a 
nonsingular square matrix and 0 is a matrix consisting of zeros) and a unimodular matrix 
U such that A=[DO]U. The matrices U,u· 1.uT,(UT)"1 have integral entries and in 
this lemma matrix D is rational. Since AT z = Vi ~T)z = u1( D;z). we have that 
AT ZE zs if and only if D T ze zk. Equation ( 4.1) has an integral solution if and only if 
Dw=db is solvable in WE zk, (4.4) 
because there is a 1-1 relationship between the solutions VE zs of (4.1) and WE zk Of 
(4.4), defined by Uv= (;). Hence d is also the smallest positive integer such that 
Dw=db has a solution in WE zk, in other words def(A;b)=def(D;b). Combining the 
previous equations gives: <z,db>=<z,Av>=<ATz,v> =< u1( D:z). v>= 
< ( D:z). U v > = < ( D:z ).( ;) > =<D T z,w> Hence (4.3) is equivalent to 
DTzezk and 
(d,<DTz,w>)=l, for every solution w of (4.4). (4.5) 
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(i) For every integer 8, the subdeterminants of [A 8b] of order k are 
µ µ ~µ .. , 811 • Now Lemma 2 implies that the equation A v = 8b has 1,.., m• Cl, m+ l' . rn 
a solution in ve zs if and only if 
(µ1' ... ,µm) I 5µi, for i=m+l, ... ,n. 
This holds if and only if ( µ 1, .. , µm)l 8 · ( µp···• µm, µm+ 1 •..• , µn). Because dis 
the smallest positive integer for which (4.1) has an integral solution in v, we have 
( P1 ····• µ,,) 
d= ( ) . µ1····· µ,,., µ,,.+ 1, ... , µ11. 
(ii) Matrix D is a kxk-matrix, so det(D) is the only subdeterminant of order k of 
D, and the matrix [D b] has k subdeterminants 17 1, ••• ,T[k of order k containing 
an entry from b. If we apply Lemma 3.(i) on matrix D , we get 
d= (d (;~t(D) ) . The matrix D and the subdeterminants 17p····11k can be 
et • 11, •..• , 1/i 
computed in polynomial time from A. Hence d can be computed in polynomial time 
and with this d, a solution w of (4.4) can be computed by Gauss elimination. With 
this w a solution v of (4.1) can also be computed in polynomial time. 
(iii) It is sufficient to prove that there is a polynomial time deterministic algorithm to 
compute a ze IQk such that (4.5) holds. Let w be a solution of (4.4) and define 
d1=gcd(wp···•wk). The equation Dx= (d,dd1) b has x= c/d 1) w as an integral 
solution. But d was the smallest positive integer for which (4.4) is solvable, so we 
must have (d,d1)=1. With (the extended ) Euclid's algorithm we find in polynomial 
time an ye zk such that <y,w>=d1. If we define z:=(D Tr1y, then ze [)k, 
D T ze Z k and (d,<D T z,w>)= (d,<y,w>)=(d,d 1)=1. Hence this z satisfies 
(4.5). D 
5. Proofs of the propositions 
We derive the four propositions of section 3 from the previous lemmas (or from Theorem 
1, using the assumption on the computability of RSA-roots by individuals). 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
(ii)<=>(iii)<=>(iv) 
This follows from Lemma 3 and the definition of defect. 
(i)=>(iii) 
Suppose that it is feasible for the individual to compute xb from ( x01 , ••• , x0 •) for 
uniformly chosen x. Put A=[a1 ••• a9] and d=def(a1, .•. ,a9 ;b). 
By Lemma 3 we can compute in polynomial time a vector z=(z1, ... ,zk)e IQk such that 
(d,<z,db>)=l and ATze Z 8 • Hence AT z=(c1, ... ,c9 )T, where ci=<ai,z>e Z for 
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i=l, ... ,s. Using (the extended) Euclid's algorithm we can feasibly compute a,f3e z 
with a<z,db>+/3d=l, so a<z,b>+/3=1/d. Choose x uniformly from z• and 
N 
Put X -(xz1 xzi:) Henc x 01 - <z,a,> c1 f · 1 S h · d" "d al 
- , ···, . e = x = x or 1= , ..• ,s. o t e m iv1 u 
can feasibly compute those x0 1 , and thus by assumption he can compute xb. But 
then it is feasible to compute ( xb)a x/3 = xa< z, b>+ f3 = x11 d. From the 
assumption on RSA-roots, it follows that d=l. This proves (iii). 
(ii)=>(i) 
Suppose there are integers v l' ... , v s such that v 1a 1 + ... + v sa s = db. Lemma 3 
states that it is feasible to compute such v 1, ... , v s· Now xb can be computed in 
. • b a vl a v' D polynomial time from x = ( x 1 ) ••• (x ') . 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
(i)<=> (ii)<=>(iii) 
This follows from Proposition 4 with A=[a1 •.. as e1 .•• ek] (note that A has full 
row rank whence the equation Ay=b is solvable in ye a:)k). 
(iii)<=> (iv) 
Define A= [a 1 •.. a sl and I= [ e 1 . .. e k]. Since each column of I has exactly one 
entry *O, each subdeterminant of [A /] containing q columns from I is a 
subdeterminant of [A] of order s-q. Further det(J)=l. Similarly, each 
subdeterminant of [A I b] containing q columns from I and at least one entry from 
bis a subdeterminant of [A b] of order s-q, containing at least one entry from b. D 
We leave the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 to the reader. 
6. Main theorem 
In our propositions of section 3, we used the assumption on the computability of RSA-
roots by individuals. These propositions can be generalized into a theorem, in which that 
assumption is not required anymore. To state this theorem we need the formalism of 
Probabilistic Turing Machines. But in this extended abstract we shall only state that 
theorem in words and therefore not prove it here. 
k Theorem 1. Let al' ... ,as,be (11'.! N) , and assume that the equation [a 1 ... as]y=b 
is solvable in ye a:)k. Hence d=def(a1,. . .,a8;b) is defined. 
X b fi h • ( a 1 a ') (1) Suppose we have a "black box" which outputs rom t e input x , ... , x 
with average probability (over x) :2:e1>0. 
.!. 
With this black box we can build an algorithm which computes u" from input u, with 
probability ;::: ~, for every fixed ue z*N. The running time of this algorithm is 
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~ P 1, where P1 depends polynomially on the length of the input (which consists of 
1 
N and the numerators and the denominators of the coordinates of a1, .. .,as,b). 
1 
(2)Suppose we have a "black box" which outputs u4 from the input with average 
probability (over u) ~e:z>O. 
With this black box we can build an algorithm which computes xb from input 
( x01, ••• , x0 •), with probability ;:::~,for everyfzxed xe (Z*N)k. The running time of 
this algorithm is -J- P 2, where P 2 depends polynomially on the same input as in 
3 
(1). 
b fro ( a 1 a') . l 'al More informally, this theorem states that computing x m x , ... , x is po ynom1 
1 
time reducible to computing u'd from u, where d;;def(a1, ... ,as;b) and x,u random. 
Under the assumption that it is infeasible for an individual to compute RSA-roots for 
random numbers, we can derive Proposition 4 (i)<=>(ii)<=>(iii) from Theorem 1. 
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